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This Article aims to supply policymakers and jurists with an 
ideologically-neutral framework for evaluating the legitimacy of 
imposing public interest duties on today’s dominant 
communicative technologies, such as Netflix, YouTube, or 
Facebook. In contrast to current literature, which often advocates 
for adopting either a libertarian or a distributive position about 
communication policies and free speech values, this Article 
suggests an ideologically-neutral, fact-based examination for 
evaluating the various sources of legitimacy with regard to both 
“old” and “new” media regulation. 
The first Part of the Article begins by adopting a socio-
historical perspective to taxonomize consensual sources for 
legitimizing media regulation within the public interest framework. 
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By unraveling these various rationales and justifications, it further 
examines the sources’ theoretical and practical applicability to 
contemporary debates about the constitutional permissibility of 
regulating internet-based content providers and platforms. The 
second Part suggests that, although both utilitarian-economic and 
egalitarian-democratic justifications for traditional media 
regulation can generally apply to new forms of commercial media, 
free speech jurisprudence lacks sufficient consensus about the 
conditions for the legitimacy of such regulation, as it suffers from 
two primary flaws: (a) lack of rationality or basis in social facts; 
and (b) lack of sensitivity to the hidden constitutional costs of 
media regulation within the public interest framework. The third 
Part of the Article offers a consensual framework for bridging 
today’s ideological divides—over media regulation and free 
speech jurisprudence alike—by suggesting common ground for 
evaluating the legitimacy of media law and policy, which both 
libertarian and egalitarian ends of the liberal-democratic 
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2.  The Need to Proportionately Accommodate 




Contemporary mass media, from television to online content 
providers and platforms, are an inseparable part of contemporary 
human society.1 They function as mediators of politics, culture, 
and information; thus, they possess a unique social power to 
influence our lives and thoughts. The centrality of mass-
communicative technologies to the wellbeing of individuals and 
society at large comprises both the engine and barrier of its 
regulation. In fact, ever since the appearance of mass 
communicative technologies at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the regulation of “the media,” in contrast to “the press,” 
has always been viewed as a necessary (and thus, legitimate) 
governmental activity.2 In practice, governments have regulated 
the twentieth century’s mass media in ways that were either 
impossible or perceived as illegitimate concerning the printed 
media in the modern era.3 Back then, communication law and 
policy were coextensive with broadcast regulation. Prime examples 
of the unique coercive powers that the state used over the dominant 
electronic media of the twentieth century are rules that prohibited 
unlicensed media activities, ownership limitations, and access 
 
1 See Vineet Kaul, Changing Paradigms of Media Landscape in the Digital Age, 2 J. 
of Mass Comm. & Journalism 110 (2012). 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 For a critical analysis of the justifications for heavier regulation on broadcasting, in 
comparison to the commercial press, see ERIC BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1995) (identifying the justifications for heavier regulation of 
broadcasting, in comparison to the commercial press, as largely contingent upon 
historical circumstances and constitutional form and tradition, rather than resting upon 
clearly defined principles). 
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rules, as well as regulations stipulating negative and positive 
content duties.4 
This Article suggests an analytical toolkit for evaluating the 
permissibility and desirability of regulating the new mediators that 
have replaced the traditional media. Today, both policymakers and 
jurists are engaged with new challenges when considering the 
legitimacy of regulating the emerging communicative technologies 
of the twenty-first century—such as Netflix, YouTube, or 
Facebook, which are rapidly replacing traditionally regulated 
media.5 The regulatory responses to the twenty-first century 
developments are still a work in progress: while in the United 
States, new media such as Netflix or YouTube are not subjected to 
the same vast regulatory regime as broadcast,6 the European Union 
and its member states responded by applying the same regulatory 
framework to traditional and online media since the enactment of 
the Audiovisual Media Services Directive in 2010,7 and its further 
update in November 2018.8 
 
4 Negative content duties are prohibitions or limitations on defined “bad” or harmful 
content, such as graphic violence, nudity, or indecencies. Positive content duties are 
duties that coerce the media to supply defined regulatory-prescribed “positive” content, 
such as news, children’s programming, or local content. For discussion of the typical 
content duties of any media regulation and their rationales, see infra Part II. 
5 See Stuart Cunningham & David Craig, Online Entertainment: A New Wave of 
Media Globalization, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 5409 (2016). 
6 See 1 BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TV § 1:23 (“These newer competitors do not have a 
regulatory regime affecting their video content per se, unlike cable and DBS. Instead, the 
regulatory issues often revolve around the technology bucket into which they fall: 
licensing and interference issues for cellular and other mobile video or access or 
nondiscrimination for broadband video providers traveling over another’s network.”). 
7 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 
2010 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or 
Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media 
Services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) [hereinafter AVMSD]. 
8 Directive 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 
2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid 
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the 
Provision of Audiovisual Media Services in View of Changing Market Realities (Nov. 14, 
2018). On November 6, 2018, the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and 
Education adopted an update for the AVMSD to include further regulation on matters 
such as protection of minors, prohibition of hate speech, promotion of European works 
and extending the scope regulation to video-sharing platforms. 
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The need to further develop the theoretical and doctrinal 
foundations of media law and policy emerges from the most 
consensual conclusion from the century-long experience with 
regulation of the electronic media: in the absence of clearly defined 
rationales and objectives for regulation, there can be no clear 
notion of how to evaluate its political or constitutional legitimacy. 
Achieving this clarity is the aim of this Article. 
At present, following a century-long experience with media 
regulation, the core questions of media law and policy—why, 
whom, and to what end should we regulate?—remain highly 
contested with regard to both the “old media” and new 
communicative technologies. The preliminary argument of this 
Article is that, in order to evaluate the legitimacy of both “old” and 
new media, it is necessary to understand these regulations’ political 
and constitutional rationales and examine their applicability to the 
new online mediators of information, politics, and culture. 
The historical rationale (or justification) for creating a vast 
apparatus of state regulation over the electronic media during the 
twentieth century was the scarcity argument, which was conceived 
with regard to broadcast media (radio and television). In short, this 
practical reason for prohibiting unlicensed broadcast activity was 
that, without central control over the allocation of broadcast 
frequencies, there could be no effective or valuable use of 
broadcast.9 Alternately stated, regulation was justified as a 
necessity, because of the unique technical nature of the broadcast 
 
9 See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, REGULATING BROADCAST 
PROGRAMMING 204 (1994) (“Scarcity—the need to ration licenses—was the first and 
remains the foremost rationale for the disparate application of the First Amendment to 
broadcasting [in comparison to the press]”); Amit M. Schejter & Moran Yemini, Justice, 
and Only Justice, You Shall Pursue: Network Neutrality, the First Amendment and John 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 137, 140 (2007) 
(Describing scarcity as the guiding principle in regulating the “old” media [broadcast 
radio and television]. Scarcity, in this context breaks down into “physical/technological 
scarcity,” as determined by either technological or economic constraints; and “content 
scarcity,” as reflected either in the number of conduits for content or in the diversity of 
content within those conduits). 
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spectrum, in which “with everybody on the air, nobody could be 
heard.”10 
This coordination problem, as the historical reason or 
justification for creating a unique regulatory apparatus over the 
electronic media, is mostly obsolete. Since the end of the twentieth 
century, the dominant audio-visual media use digital delivery 
methods (such as cables or internet-based delivery), to which the 
scarcity argument for media regulation does not apply.11 Hence, 
broadcast media and the scarcity rationale play a very limited role 
in the twenty-first century’s media landscape, since digital mass 
media services and platforms are rapidly replacing broadcast as 
primary social channels for mediating information, culture, and 
politics to the public. 
Now, more than ever, policymakers, judges, and citizens need 
analytical tools for evaluating the legitimacy or desirability of 
regulatory practices over the many forms of new mass media. To 
do so, it is necessary to look back at the century-long experience of 
media law and policy (and its judicial review), and to understand 
the competing raison d’etre of using the states’ coercive power 
over society’s dominant mediators of information to the public. In 
addressing this challenge, the discussion in this Article suggests a 
consensual framework for assessing the political and constitutional 
legitimacy of regulating both “old” and “new” media, to which 
both utilitarian and rights-based approaches to constitutional rights 
are in agreement. 
Part I of this Article begins by adopting a socio-legal analysis 
to identify and taxonomize the various consensual sources for 
legitimizing media law and policy in the last century. Part II turns 
to the present and discusses the contemporary problems of judicial 
review and free speech jurisprudence with respect to evaluating the 
legitimacy or permissibility of media regulation. First, it addresses 
the constitutional debate over the permissibility of using the state’s 
 
10 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943). 
11 At present, scarcity is an old problem of “old media.” See Schejter & Yemini, supra 
note 9, at 243 (framing communication policy through a prism of scarcity is no longer 
relevant in the age of broadband internet). 
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coercive power for the allocative/distributive management of 
speech. Second, it addresses the political-moral dispute within 
liberalism about the competing values of free speech and media 
regulation. Third, it identifies the principle of state neutrality as the 
unifying challenge for both political theory and free speech 
jurisprudence in evaluating the legitimacy of any public-interest 
regulation of private power in the public sphere. Part III proceeds 
to suggest a consensual framework for assessing the legitimacy of 
typical regulatory duties over the media by developing the primary 
conditions for political and constitutional legitimacy: (1) 
rationality (the factual question of the necessity; requirement for 
social facts); and (2) proportionality between the relative weight of 
the competing values that both media regulation and free speech 
jurisprudence share: liberty, equality, and diversity.12 
I. THE COMPETING JUSTIFICATIONS OF COMMUNICATION LAW & 
POLICY: TAXONOMY AND APPLICABILITY 
The political and legal reasoning about media regulation and its 
desirability were formulated during the twentieth century with 
regard to broadcast media as the emerging communicative 
technology of the time.13 Although the broadcast medium plays a 
very limited role in today’s information age, the discussion in this 
Section suggests that the primary rationales for public-interest 
regulation of broadcast can be applied to new communicative 
technologies as a matter of principle. By adopting socio-historic 
analysis as a legal realism approach,14 this Section offers a 
taxonomy of the various reasons and rationales for regulating 
 
12 For a discussion of the consensual value of diversity in media law and policy, see 
infra Section III.C. 
13 See 1 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 6, § 1:10.  
14 Socio-historical analysis, as a branch of legal realism, focuses on the work of 
society’s coercive normative institutions and avoids the normativity impulse of common 
legal scholarship. See Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Character of Legal Theory, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 671, 675 (2010) (Socio-historical analysis considers law to be a subject 
matter or a field of inquiry distinct from traditional legal science, while suspending direct 
normative evaluation of law and public policy). 
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media and communicative technologies in the name of the public 
interest. 
Section A of this Part begins by presenting the moral and 
practical importance of “the public interest” concept, as the 
guiding framework of both policy-making and legal reasoning 
about media law and policy. The next Sections of this Part (B–D) 
taxonomize the competing approaches to the meaning of the public 
interest in the context of media regulation, and, respectively, the 
competing theories of justice and legitimacy that have guided and 
still guide media regulation and its judicial review. 
A. The Importance and Ambiguity of “The Public Interest” in 
Communication Law and Policy 
The concept of “the public interest” plays an essential role in 
the political and legal justifications of mass-media regulation.15 
The public interest framework had key importance during the 
twentieth century, both as the common source to justify media 
regulation and as the standard for evaluating such regulation’s 
efficiency, desirability, or, more generally, its legitimacy. 
Moreover, it continues to be the guiding standard of contemporary 
media law and policy.16 
The “public interest” stands for the principle that the special 
interests of the public (or of society) regarding the media serve as 
the primary source for legitimizing coercive regulation over it. As 
McQuail elaborated: 
The public interest expresses the idea that 
expectations from, and claims against, the mass 
media on the grounds of the wider and longer-term 
good of society—can be legitimately expressed and 
 
15 See MIKE FEINTUCK & MIKE VARNEY, MEDIA REGULATION, PUBLIC INTEREST AND 
THE LAW 74–77 (2d ed. 2013) (regarding the United Kingdom and the European Union); 
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 9, at 13 (regarding the United States). 
16 Currently, public-interest regulation of online content providers has been adopted in 
Europe since 2010 by the AVMSD, which stipulates technology-neutral regulation of 
audiovisual media, guided by the principle of “the public interest.” 
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may lead to constraints on the structure or activity 
of media.  
The content of what is “in the public interest” takes 
various forms. Its most minimal interpretation is 
that the media should meet the needs of their 
audiences, but ethical, ideological, political and 
legal considerations may also lead to much stronger 
definitions.17 
Before beginning to reason about the actual content of the 
public interest with regard to the media, it is important to 
understand the moral and political significance of this term, as it is 
the primary political reason or constitutional justification for 
imposing public duties over private-commercial media services.18 
As the literature suggests, it is possible to identify three 
competing perceptions of what constitutes the content of the public 
interest in the context of public policy19: (1) the “Preponderance 
Theory,” which identifies the public interest with the preferences 
of the majority in a political community (to wit, the public interest 
is “what the public wants”); (2) the “Common Interest Theory,” by 
which the public interest is composed of any interest that all 
members of the political community are presumed to share in 
common (such as the interest in utilities or policing), with little 
room for dispute or negotiation about individuals’ actual 
preferences; and (3) the “Unitary Theory,” which defines the 
public interest on the basis of a normative theory or wide ideology 
about what the public needs, absent sensitivity to popular 
preferences. With regard to media law and policy, the literature 
identifies the rationales underlying media regulation in the 
twentieth century as guided mostly by unitary theory, hence 
 
17 See DENIS MCQUAIL, MCQUAIL’S MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 568 (6th ed. 
2010) [hereinafter MCQUAIL-2010]. 
18 Of course, regulation of private or commercial activity in the name of the public 
interest is not unique to media law and policy. As Feintuck & Varney identified, much 
regulatory activity—not only of the media, but also of utilities—is usually justified in 
terms of the public interest. FEINTUCK & VARNEY, supra note 15, at 74. 
19 This classification is based on Denis McQuail, Media Performance: Mass 
Communication and the Public Interest 23–25 (1992) [hereinafter McQuail-1992]. 
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described as having a “frequently authoritarian, paternalistic or 
ideologically contestable character.”20 
However, the clearest lesson from the century-long experience 
of media regulation is that the public interest concept with regard 
to media regulation is highly vague; therefore, it is of little use to 
evaluate whether a specific law or policy meets this indefinite 
standard. Even after almost a century of experience, the 
contemporary literature suggests that, in the context of media 
regulation, the public interest standard remained highly vague and 
contested, as “the rationales for regulation (‘why regulate?’) and 
the objectives of regulation (‘with what end in mind?’) have been 
insufficiently addressed.”21 Despite the various theoretical attempts 
to define the public interest in the context of old or new media, this 
term remains “both vague and contentious.”22 
As elaborated upon in the next sections, the various, often-
competing views of what constitutes the public interest in the 
media—which were conceived of with regard to the media 
regulation in the twentieth century—are still the source of 
contemporary tensions and conflicts about desired policies and 
their legitimacy. The following sections reveal that the vagueness 
of the public interest term as the guiding standard for evaluating 
the legitimacy or desirability of media regulation over the last 
century does not stem from lack of ideas about the meaning of the 
term, but rather from the plurality of competing understandings of 
what it implies. 
B. The Utilitarian / Market-Based Justification: Giving the Public 
What It Wants 
When we perceive the public interest as “giving the public 
what it wants,” the reason for using the state’s coercive power over 
any private-commercial activity is grounded in the utilitarian 
principle of satisfying preferences or optimizing social welfare. 
 
20 Id. at 25. 
21 Id. at 5. 
22 Id. at 75 (“[E]ven when attempts have been made to define the concept, they tend to 
incorporate rather than resolve tensions between competing versions of it.”). 
814         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:803 
 
This utilitarian, market-based approach to justice in 
communication law and policy can be identified (and distinguished 
from Rawlsian distributive justice) by these three principles23: (a) 
the utilitarian approach is goal-oriented, rather than rights-based; 
(b) the utilitarian approach focuses on maximizing the general 
welfare, rather than on the way the benefits of the media are 
distributed; and (c) the utilitarian approach may justify and require 
favoring the few at the expense of the many, in the name of the 
common good.24 
Within this economic-utilitarian framework, the legitimacy of a 
specific regulatory rule or policy is mostly an empirical matter, in 
the sense that this approach offers no normative prescription of 
“the good life” or valuations regarding media outputs. Instead, the 
economic-utilitarian approach considers the aim of regulation to 
involve fulfilling individual preferences and maximizing social 
welfare through an efficient allocation of resources. 
This reasoning regarding media law and policy is often 
categorized as the “economic justifications” for media regulation. 
In essence, this classic utilitarian-economic rationale for media 
regulation is that unregulated media markets exhibit strong 
tendencies to succumb into oligopolistic patterns.25 Consequently, 
unregulated media markets are limited in their ability to supply 
their audience with what it wants.26 Thus, utilitarian arguments for 
using the state’s power to regulate media ownership and content 
comprise a private case of the familiar classic/neo liberal 
 
23 Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 142–43. 
24 Id. 
25 FEINTUCK & VARNEY, supra note 15, at 97. 
26 C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY (W. Lance Bennett & Robert 
M. Entman eds., 2001) (justifying media regulation by identifying the structural limits of 
media markets with serving the public interest in terms of ‘giving people what they 
want.’); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311 
(1997); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1641, 1666 (1967) (justifying media regulation by showing how the market of 
mass media tend towards concentration, which in turn limits the diversity and vibrancy of 
their outputs). 
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justification for markets regulation27: correcting market failures 
that limit the ability of a free market to optimize social welfare. 
“Regulation in such cases is argued to be justified because the 
uncontrolled marketplace will, for some reason, fail to produce 
behavior or results in accordance with the public interest.”28 
In its basic meaning, market failure is identified by economic 
parameters, such as monopolies, market share, or externalities—
which lead to inefficient competitions or incentives in designated 
markets.29 Within this framework, the economic justifications for 
media regulation take root in the notion that media outputs, as 
commercial products, may not be distributed efficiently without 
market regulations.30 That is, the underlying assumptions about the 
ability of free markets to supply people with what they want do not 
apply so well to media products.31 As such, the utilitarian-
economic justification for media regulation is highly-
consequential, as the legitimacy of using the state’s coercive 
powers depends on a straightforward utilitarian notion of 
comparing the consequences of regulation to those of its absence 
(regarding the goal of maximizing utility and individual 
preferences).  
In the constitutional domain, the utilitarian reason has 
comprised the basis for adopting the freedom of speech into 
American jurisprudence and the “marketplace of ideas” concept as 
 
27 See, e.g., Reeve T. Bull, Market Corrective Rulemaking: Drawing on EU Insights to 
Rationalize U.S. Regulation, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2015).  
28 ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: 
THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 15 (2d ed. 2012). 
29 Id. 
30 BAKER, supra note 26, at 7–14. 
31 BAKER, supra note 26, at 8–13 (explaining the ability of markets to efficiently 
supply people with what they want, is based on two primary assumptions: (1) products 
are sold in competitive markets at a price close to their marginal cost; (2) the production 
and consumption of the product does not involve significant externalities on third parties. 
In this regard, Baker showed that media products have unique features vis-à-vis regular 
products: media have significant ‘public good’ aspects, at least with regard to broadcast 
and other payment-free media services. Moreover, with both ‘free’ and pay-based 
commercial media, the marginal cost of serving an additional consumer predictably will 
be substantially less than the average cost). 
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the dominant reason in judicial review of media regulation in the 
twentieth century.32 
Moreover, the economical-utilitarian approach to the public 
interest—and to justice in general—not only justifies the existing 
regulation of traditional media but can generally be applied to the 
commercial media of the twenty-first century. That is, present 
commercial mass-media, such as Facebook and YouTube, have 
similar economic characteristics that are inconsistent with the 
classical assumption about the ability of unregulated markets in 
supplying people with what they want. First, contemporary 
technologies of mass-media—as was with the twentieth century 
media and media markets—are trending toward concentration and 
consolidations, due to the medium-natural effects of size in content 
production and distribution.33 Second, as was the case in the 
twentieth century, contemporary content platforms operate within 
two-sided market conditions, whereby profits are not derived from 
users, but rather from advertisers (to which the media sell 
advertising slots) or third parties (to which the new media sells 
information about the users).34 Third, since both traditional and 
new media are the primary mediators of information and politics, 
 
32 See Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 143, for a discussion about the utilitarian 
nature of American free speech jurisprudence. 
33 See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY (2004); Guy Rolnik, 
Digital Platforms and Concentrations, U. CHI. BOOTH SCH. BUS. (2018), https://
promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Digital-Platforms-and-Concentration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SNM3-7DBV]. 
34 Within the utilitarian-economic justification for broadcast regulation, the character 
of media markets as two-sided markets means that the media’s revenues derived from 
advertisers and not directly from their audiences. Hence, those conditions inherently limit 
the ability of unregulated content platforms to maximize their consumers’ preferences. 
See BAKER, supra note 26, at 11 (“advertisers in effect pay the media firm to gain an 
audience by providing the audience with something that audience wants, although not 
necessarily what the audience most want”); Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public 
Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 514 (2000) (“television is not an ordinary product, for 
broadcasters do not sell programming to viewers in return to cash . . .  this phenomenon 
introduces some serious distortion, at least if we understand an ideal broadcasting market 
as one in which viewers receive what they want.”). 
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their products have significant positive and negative social 
externalities,35 which the media do not internalize. 
Pointing to those economic similarities between broadcasting 
and contemporary mediators of speech does not aim to suggest that 
they are identical, or that they should be economically regulated in 
a same manner.36 They serve to support a more-modest argument: 
those who adopt the utilitarian/economic approach to justice 
should not consider regulation of both new and old media as 
categorically impermissible. As the discussion in this Section 
illustrated, the utilitarian/economic justification for media 
regulation may legitimize regulation of the “new mediators” by 
asserting its necessity and proportionality.37 
C. Harm-Based Justification: Mass-Communication Technologies 
as a Social Risk 
In any version of liberal democracy, individuals are morally 
and legally obliged not to harm other individuals. Thus, the state 
may prohibit or limit harmful activity, and the legitimacy of such 
state actions depends on the liberal harm principle: “[t]he only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.”38 
As a descriptive argument, consensus exists that, during the 
twentieth century, commercial media were perceived as possessing 
significant ability to harm individuals or society at large.39 This 
 
35 BAKER, supra note 26, at 10 ("Media products often produce extraordinary 
significant positive and negative externalities. Externalities typically refer to the value 
some item has to someone who does not participate in the transaction"). 
36 See Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age, BUFF. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (describing today’s digital capitalism, in which people pay for 
information though digital surveillance and exploiting personal data of their audiences, as 
economically different than the twentieth century’s media). 
37 For discussion about the conditions of rationality and proportionality in this context, 
see infra Part III. 
38 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Batoche Books 2001) (1859). 
39 See, e.g., FEINTUCK & VARNEY, supra note 15, at 5 (describing the democratic 
justification for media regulation as power-based, whereby those who exercise either 
governmental or private power legitimately have their powers limited, guided by the 
818         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:803 
 
public notion of the media posing a severe risk to the wellness of 
individuals and society naturally called for regulation in order to 
protect the wellbeing of media audiences. 
This harm-based justification of media regulation is no less 
potent regarding new media today than it was historically with 
regard to broadcasted media. In debating the need to regulate 
YouTube or Facebook, we should acknowledge that the liberal 
harm principle was and still is the primary source of political 
legitimacy for any suppressive content duties on the media, 
comprising a particular use of the state’s restrictive powers. A 
notable example is the question of regulating “fake new” on social 
media. Contemporary calls to use the state’s coercive power to 
suppress or limit this kind of content rely on the consensual harm 
principle, as it focuses on the harmful consequence of this 
content.40 
To understand the important role of the harm principle in 
media regulation and free speech jurisprudence, consider the 
medium-dependent regulation of indecencies as an example of the 
risk-based reason for regulating the media (and for diminishing the 
media’s constitutional protection against governmental regulation). 
The prohibitions or limitations on indecencies make a good test 
case for illustrating the harm-based rationale of media regulation, 
 
 
democratic principle of decentralization social power; thus, given the broad extent of 
power that the media exercise as dominant mediators of information, politics, and culture, 
they must be regulated to prevent their unique potential to induce individual and social 
harms); KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 9, at 221–24 (identifying the rationale of 
protecting individuals and society from the unique pervasive power of the media as the 
main political and constitutional justification for denying full First Amendment 
Protection to the 20th century media); see also, MCQUAIL-2010, supra note 17, at 564 
(identifying the unique social concerns with regards to the electronic media of the 20th 
century as irrational or unfounded mass anxiety and concern about the media’s harmful 
effects on individual behavior and social order).  
40 See, e.g., Adam Kucharski, Post-Truth: Study Epidemiology of Fake News, 540 
NATURE 525 (2016) (harm-based call for state intervention by identifying fake news as a 
matter of social risk that must be regulated to protect society against its harmful 
consequences). 
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since they stipulate negative content duties for the media,41 which 
are considered to be protected speech elsewhere. 
The robust American debate over the legitimacy of regulatory 
limitations on indecencies reveals the liberal harm principle as 
guiding both the governmental policy and its judicial review. One 
of the most notable examples of the harm principle’s application 
with regard to medium-specific suppression of indecent content is 
the case of Pacifica Found, in which the Supreme Court 
demonstrated the harm-based rationale for both regulating the 
media and limiting their constitutional protection under the First 
Amendment: 
[T]he broadcast media have established a uniquely 
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans  . . .  
Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning 
in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect 
the listener or viewer from unexpected program 
content. To say that one may avoid further offense 
by turning off the radio when he hears indecent 
language is like saying that the remedy for an 
assault is to run away after the first blow.42 
The constitutional outcome of this harm-principle reasoning, 
besides upholding the regulatory rules in this case, is the Court’s 
general position that, “[o]f all forms of communication, 
broadcasting has the most limited First Amendment protection” 
due to its unique potential to harm its audiences.43  
A more contemporary example of the harm principle as a 
potential source of legitimizing negative content duties regarding 
indecencies is the ongoing attempt to regulate indecencies over the 
 
41 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than two years, or both”). 
42 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
43 Id. at 728; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727, 743 (1996). Courts’ willingness to uphold statutory provisions designed to screen 
children from indecent programming continued later with regard to cable television. See 
infra note 50.  
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internet. The Communication Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)44 
comprised the first notable attempt to regulate indecencies or 
pornography on the ground of preventing harm to viewers and 
third parties that would be affected by the viewers’ beliefs or 
behavior.45 The Supreme Court struck down this use of the state’s 
coercive power in the case of Reno v. ACLU.46 As a direct 
response, the US Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act 
of 1998 (COPA),47 with the aim of restricting minors’ access to 
harmful materials. Once again, the courts struck down COPA, as 
an unjustified violation of the First Amendment.48 
Despite the different constitutional treatment of indecency 
regulation over broadcast and the Internet, the reasoning remains 
the same: negative content-duties (censorship or suppression of 
speech) with regard to (any) mass media may be legitimate in 
preventing harmful consequences of unregulated access to harmful 
content.49 In the context of regulating indecencies over the 
 
44 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2012). 
45 See generally, Lili Levi, The FCC’s Regulation of Indecency,  FIRST AMENDMENT 
CENTER, First Reports Vol. 7, No. 1 (Apr. 2008) https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org
/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/FirstReport.Indecency.Levi_.final_.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BS8F-ZHRS].  
46 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
47 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2012). 
48 In Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court upheld an injunction on 
enforcement of COPA, ruling that the law was likely to be unconstitutional. 535 U.S. 564 
(2002). The Court later referred the case back to the district court for a trial. 564 U.S. at 
656. In 2007, the district court struck down COPA, finding the law facially in violation of 
the First and Fifth Amendments. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 
775 (E.D. Pa. 2007), cert. denied, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009). 
49 For an elaborate discussion of indecency regulation in broadcast, cable, and new 
media on the grounds of these medias’ unique pervasive and harmful nature, see Matthew 
Bloom, Pervasive New Media: Indecency Regulation and the End of the Distinction 
Between Broadcast Technology and Subscription-Based Media, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 109 
(2006). For more on the Supreme Court’s consistent tendency to strike-down regulatory 
rules that sought to limit indecencies on cable television and on the Internet, on the 
grounds of violating the First Amendment, see Joel Timmer, The Seven Dirty Words You 
Can Say on Cable and DBS, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 179 (2010) (about cable and satellite 
television); Emily Vander Wilt, Considering COPA, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373 
(2004) (about the internet); Christopher M. Kelly, Spectre of a Wired Nation: Denver 
Area Educational Telecommunication Consortium v. FCC and First Amendment Analysis 
in Cyberspace, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 559 (1997) (comparing the Supreme Court 
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Internet, the Court reasoned that the legitimacy of such regulation 
depends on the questions of necessity and proportionality,50 while 
approving the fundamental reasoning of the harm principle as a 
consensual justification for media and content regulation.51 
The use of the classic harm principle to justify suppressive 
content duties is not limited to indecencies, of course. During most 
of the twentieth century, broad public and governmental anxiety 
surrounded the unique harmful effects of the media and their 
content on individuals and society.52 The magnitude of risk and 
potential harms that are associated with mass-communicative 
technologies often legitimizes broader content regulation (and, 
therefore, limited constitutional protections), in order to restrain 
the media’s unique power to harm individuals and society at 
large.53 As the twentieth century’s media were perceived as a 
tremendous social risk, it was considered legitimate to force 
special content limitations on various of allegedly harmful media 




tendency to allow suppression of indecent content on cable television while striking-
down such regulation on internet-based media). 
50 In the case of Reno, the Court reasoned (correctly) that as a matter of history, 
broadcast media had “‘received the most limited First Amendment protection,’ in large 
part because warnings could not adequately protect the listener from unexpected program 
content,” in contrast to Internet users, who must take “a series of affirmative steps” to 
access explicit material. 521 U.S. at 867 (internal citations omitted). 
51 See id. at 868. 
52  A prime example is the regulation of graphic violence on the 20th century’s media, 
based on the reasoning that exposure to such content might cause harmful behavior. For 
the question of causality regarding media exposure and harmful behavior of views, see 
infra Section III.A.2. 
53 In literature, this harm-based rationale is often characterized as ‘Media 
accountability.’ This term stands for the idea (and the processes associated with realizing 
it) that media can and should be held account for the consequences of their publishing 
activities to society in general and/or to other interest that may be affected. MCQUAIL-
2010, supra note 17, at 562. 
54 For the focus of early and contemporary studies on these kinds of “bad” or 
“harmful” media content as the basis for regulatory limitations on such content, see W. 
JAMES POTTER, MEDIA EFFECTS 35 (2012); Leonard Reinecke & Mary Beth Oliver, 
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At present, the harm principle remains a powerful rationale for 
content regulation with regard to the dominant mediators of 
content in the twenty-first century (namely, Facebook and 
YouTube) as it was with respect to television in the twentieth 
century. Given the public interest in assuring the accountability of 
dominant media and the protection from various harms, the harm 
principle should apply to both traditional and new media, as long 
as they pose a potential threat to the wellbeing of individuals or 
society.55 Thus, content regulation of both old and new commercial 
media can be morally and constitutionally justified, but only if 
such regulation meets the general conditions of rationality (a 
proven risk from the regulated content) and proportionality (the 
regulation is narrowly tailored to the harmful content and is 
applied to result in the least collateral damage to free speech 
values).56 
D. The Distributive / Democracy-Based Justification: Giving the 
Public What It Needs 
The typical “positive” or “prescriptive” regulatory duties that 
were imposed on the twentieth century media, such as universal or 
accessible service, the fairness doctrine, or the duty to supply 
preferred content (news, local content, or children programming), 
accomplish something other than satisfying individual preferences 
or negating potential harms to individuals’ wellbeing. They coerce 
the media to actively use their resources to promote the collective 
needs of a democratic society: equality and self-governance, and 
not just the value of individual liberty. In the constitutional sphere, 
this kind of reasoning underlies the democratic or progressive 
 
 
Preface, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MEDIA USE AND WELL-BEING (Leonard 
Reinecke & Mary Beth Oliver eds., 2017). 
55 For example, contemporary calls for content-regulation on social networks and other 
content platforms focus on materials which might cause harm to their audience (such as 
graphic violence, drug-use or unrealistic body images), or influence their audience to 
harm others (such as content supporting terrorism or racism). 
56 For a discussion of the importance of rationality and proportionality as conditions 
for political and constitutional legitimacy, see infra Part III. 
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positions in which state regulation of the media is consistent with, 
and may even be required by, the right to free speech.57 Hence, this 
distributive or democracy-based justification of both the right to 
free speech and media regulation shares an instrumental, values-
oriented conception of the First Amendment.58 In essence, this 
democratic-distributive rationale for media regulation perceives the 
constitutional right to free speech as justifying (and even requiring) 
the state to reallocate speech opportunities to secure the collective 
needs of a democratic society.59 
This democratic-distributive rationale for media regulation 
emerged as a response to the political economy of speech in the 
twentieth century,60 in which the (commercial) media and their 
markets served the interest of only those who could or were willing 
to pay for them.61 The inclusion of egalitarian values within the 
public interest approach to media law and policy in the second half 
of the twentieth century relied on the “maturation” of classical 
liberalism into political liberalism (as a matter of principle), as 
well as on the political economy of the media markets (as a matter 
of policy).62 
This shift in the understanding of the right to free speech as a 
source for legitimizing media regulation gained its greatest 
prominence in the Red Lion case, during the golden age of mass 
 
57 Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 783 (1987). For previous 
formulation of this democratic-affirmative interpretation of the first amendment, see 
Barron, supra note 26; Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of The First 
Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795 (1981). For a contemporary formulation of this 
democratic reasoning of the First Amendment as an “active liberty” which justifies 
regulation and enhances public discourse, see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 39 (2005). 
58 See Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech: The First Amendment at 
War with Itself, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1211, 1213 (2007). 
59 See id. at 1217 (“In all cases, the government is intervening in media markets by 
redistributing power over the means and content of communication to further First 
Amendment speech values.”). 
60 See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 514. 
61 See id.  
62 For a discussion of the joint maturation of liberalism and free speech theory from 
utilitarianism to distributive justice and its effect on free speech jurisprudence, see infra 
Part II.A. 
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media.63 In this landmark case, the Court reasoned that although 
broadcast regulation might violate the First Amendment, the 
Government could legitimately act to enhance public discourse by 
recognizing a “collective right” of the audience to free speech, 
which is paramount to that of the media as a speaker.64 
In fact, this progressive shift of free speech jurisprudence in the 
second half of the twentieth century was a direct result of the 
establishment of the electronic mass media as the dominant public 
discourse arena. As Balkin suggested: 
[I]t is no accident that the progressivist/republican 
approach to free speech arose in the twentieth 
century, for this was also the century of mass 
media. People who endorse democratic theories of 
free speech understand that although mass media 
can greatly benefit democracy, there is also a 
serious potential conflict between mass media and 
democratic self-governance. The reason is that mass 
media are held by a comparatively few people, and 
their ownership gives this relatively small group 
enormous power to shape public discourse and 
public debate.65 
As such, the democratic-distributive justification for using the 
state’s coercive power to either suppress or promote different kinds 
of speech and speakers rests on three evaluative arguments about 
the dangerous consequences of avoiding regulation66: (1) the 
people who control mass media (wealthy or powerful individuals) 
will skew the coverage of public issues to promote views that they 
support; (2) the mass media will omit important information, 
issues, and positions that the public should take into account, 
 
63 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). This legal reasoning was 
originally formulated about the printed press in Associated Press v. United States, 326 
U.S. 1 (1945). 
64 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. 
65 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2004). 
66 Id. 
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resulting in exposure to only a limited set of facts or ideas; and (3) 
the mass media will reduce the quality of public discourse in the 
quest for higher revenues and other profits that come with them, 
resulting in over-simplification and “dumbing down” of 
discussions on public issues and transforming news and politics 
into forms of entertainment and spectacles. 
By relying on these factual assumptions, the democratic theory 
of free speech, supported by Rawlsian political liberalism, supplies 
a powerful counter-reason to the straightforward utilitarian 
approach to the public interest in the media. It is not just what the 
public wants, but also what democratic self-governance needs.67 
Thus, both democratic theory of free speech and Rawlsian 
distributive justice share the notion that those who exercise 
(political or private) social power should legitimately have their 
powers limited, guided by the democratic principle of 
decentralization of social power.68 
Thus, the democratic-distributive justification for regulating 
the twentieth century’s dominant media might be applied to the 
new commercial media of the twenty-first century (such as 
Facebook and YouTube), as they have replaced the power of 
 
67 As Balkin explains: 
[D]emocracy-based theorists of free speech in the twentieth century 
have argued that government must regulate the mass media in a 
number of different ways: (1) by restricting and preventing media 
concentration; (2) by imposing public-interest obligations that require 
the broadcast media to include programming that covers public issues 
and covers them fairly; and (3) by requiring the broadcast media to 
grant access to a more diverse and wide-ranging group of speakers in 
order to expand the agenda of public discussion. 
Id. at 30–31. 
68 See FEINTUCK & VARNEY supra note 15, at 5 (“The centrality of the media to 
democracy, as the primary information source, cannot be overemphasized, and the very 
fact that democracy requires citizens to be informed if they are to act effectively as 
citizens, serves as a prima facie justification for regulation within a democratic 
context.”). Thus, the democratic justification for media regulation differs from the 
utilitarian reasoning, by rejecting treatment of the media as pure commercial activity. 
“Given its essential nature in relation to democracy, the media cannot be treated like a 
commodity; the democratic premium on diversity and universal availability means that 
these features cannot be left to chance.” Id. at 103. 
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television as the dominant commercial mediators of information, 
politics, and culture.69 In fact, notable scholars point out that 
today’s new media are even more powerful than the “old” media in 
their abilities to influence the flow of information and politics to 
the public.70 Since the democratic-distributive framework for 
communication policy and free speech jurisprudence adopts an 
instrumental-collectivist conception of the right to free speech, it is 
not limited to broadcast or traditional media.71 This framework 
may justify further regulation of new communicative 
technologies—in order to secure the speech rights of the public 
against the predictable outcomes of concentrations in ownership 
over the means to deliver information to the public.72 
In concluding this Part, the socio-historic analysis reveals 
various sources of political and constitutional legitimacy of media 
regulation.73 Alongside the harm principle, the primary sources for 
legitimizing media regulation are the competing theories of justice 
about media regulation and free speech jurisprudence: the 
utilitarian-economic approach (which perceives of media 
audiences as consumers) and the democratic-distributive approach 
(which regards media audiences as citizens).74 Both of which 
tolerate speech regulation in the name of “the public interest,” 
 
69 See Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9 (adopting the democratic-distributive rational 
for media regulation in the context of contemporary debates over communication policy 
in the era of broadband internet). 
70 Balkin, supra note 36; TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS (1st ed. 2016) 
(describing the digital media’s unprecedented powers to capture and influence their 
audience attention, which was made possible by their new technological abilities to 
collect and analyze personal data about their users). 
71 See source cited supra note 65.  
72 Contemporary calls for addressing information intermediaries (namely, Facebook or 
Google) as fiduciaries or public trustees. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment 
Obsolete? KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE (Sept. 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org
/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete [https://perma.cc/J4XE-LQ9Y] (arguing for 
imposing public trustee duties on major speech platforms, in the spirit of Red Lion Case, 
in which the Court prioritized the speech rights of the public over the speech rights of the 
media. The specific duties that Wu suggests imposing on major speech platforms as 
public trustees include “general duties to police fake users, remove propaganda robots, 
and promote a robust speech environment surrounding matters of public concern”). 
73 See infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
74 See FEINTUCK & VERRNEY, supra note 15, at 78; GOODMAN supra note 58, at 1231.  
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while emphasizing the undesired results of concentrated control of 
communicative resources.75 
At present, as was in the second half of the twentieth century, 
these two competing theories of justice still inform policy-making 
and judicial review.76 The contention between those two theories 
of justice is ideological, as both theories take different stands on 
the proper relationship between economics and political power, as 
well as on the role that the state and the constitutional right to free 
speech should play in structuring that relationship.77   
II. PRESENT PROBLEMS: EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LEGITIMACY OF NEW MEDIA REGULATION 
The discussion in the previous Part demonstrates how both the 
utilitarian and the democratic rationales that legitimized the 
twentieth century’s media regulation can explain the sources of 
contemporary calls for content regulation of new communicative 
technologies.78 With that, it also illustrated the fundamental divide 
over the social aims that communication law and policy should 
promote, or what justice demands with regard to private power and 
state authority in the public sphere. The present Part aims to show 
how those old questions about justice in media regulation stand at 
the core of today’s robust debate over the constitutionality of 
regulating new communicative technologies. 
 
75 See sources cited supra note 74. 
76 OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996) (arguing that the liberal tension between 
liberty and equality could be described as the familiar unsolved tension between 
capitalism and democracy); Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 141 (although the 
Rawlsian approach to justice embraces capitalism and the role of markets in fair 
regulation, it directly contradicts traditional utilitarianism due to its focus on correcting 
the ills of the past before adopting new policies). 
77 See supra note 76. 
78 See supra Part I. The prominent contemporary example is the moral and 
constitutional debate over the constitutional permissibility of imposing new neutrality 
rules on ISPs. In this debate, as was with broadcast regulation in the 20th century, it is 
divided between market-based theory of justice (which seeks to maximize economic 
efficiency) and the democratic-distributive theory of justice. See Schejter & Yemini, 
supra note 9. 
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That said, the discussion here does not take sides on the 
ideological divide over the competing theories of justice about 
media law and policy. Rather, it shows how the failure to identify, 
acknowledge, and address the tension between the competing 
reasons and justifications for regulation undermines any attempt to 
regulate. To better inform current debates about speech regulation 
with regard to new forms of mass communicative technologies, 
this Part identifies the theoretical and practical challenges facing 
current free speech jurisprudence in ensuring the legitimacy of 
government regulation over the media and their content. 
A. The Challenges of Political Theory and Free Speech 
Jurisprudence: Liberalism Divided 
The challenge of present political theory regarding media 
regulation and free speech jurisprudence stems from the maturation 
of Liberalism during the second half of the twentieth century.79 
Until the mid-twentieth century, liberalism was defined almost 
exclusively by the principle of protecting individual liberty from 
state intrusion.80 The progressive change in liberal thought is 
mostly associated with John Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971), 
which introduced the egalitarian Difference Principle of 
redistribution in favor of the worst-off social groups.81 Thus, 
equality has become one of the defining goals of progressive or 
political liberalism and a legitimate source for the coercive use of 
state power.82 Moreover, within this approach of political 
liberalism, sometimes individual liberty must be “sacrificed” to 
protect disadvantaged groups from unjust subordination, which in 
turn protects substantial democratic participation in the public 
sphere.83 
 
79 See Schejter & Yemini supra note 9, at 146–54. 
80 FISS, supra note 76, at 4. 
81 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harv. U. Press eds., Revised ed. 1999) 
(“[t]he primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the 
way which major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation”). 
82 FISS, supra note 76, at 1. 
83 Id. 
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Presently, free speech jurisprudence—as the source of and 
constraint on media regulation—is highly divided between 
competing versions of liberalism as a political theory.84 This 
challenge involves the ongoing conflict between the libertarian and 
progressive poles of liberalism, as was notably described by Owen 
Fiss at the end of the twentieth century: 
Liberals are at war with themselves. For some time, 
freedom of speech has held them together, but now 
it is a source of division and conflict [ . . . ] this 
division within liberalism arises not from its 
pluralistic commitments and inability to prioritize 
equality and liberty but rather from a dispute over 
the very meaning of freedom. What is at issue is 
two different ways of understanding liberty.85 
The conflict between “two different ways of understating 
liberty” in this context can be summarized as follows: should we 
understand liberty and constitutional rights as shields to protect 
individuals (and thus, prioritize individual freedom over the 
collective needs of a free society), or rather, should we understand 
liberty and constitutional rights as a source for an allocative use of 
state power?86 Respectively, should the constitutional right to free 
speech serve individuality (as classic liberalism demands) or 
collective needs (as political or progressive liberalism demands)? 
Two decades after Fiss’s observation, this liberal divide is still 
the primary problem of media law and policy, as exemplified by 
the conflicting libertarian and Rawlsian understandings of the right 
to free speech as both the barrier and justification for media 
regulation. At present, liberalism—as a normative theory for 
evaluating the many uses of state power—seems too rich or plural 
to offer consensual conditions for evaluating the legitimacy of the 
allocative use of state power vis-à-vis speech and the flow of 
information in society. In this plurality of reasonable regulatory 
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regulation should be understood as ideological divisions over the 
relative importance of liberty and equality—as the core values of 
free speech. 
In fact, the egalitarian shift in liberalism, as a political theory, 
is directly connected to a significant shift in free speech 
jurisprudence during the second half of the twentieth century, 
namely the democratic theory of free speech.87 At its core, the 
democratic theory of free speech examines the proper relationship 
of economic and political power in a democratic society and the 
role that the constitutional right to free speech might play in 
structuring this relationship.88 As discussed above, this line of 
reasoning underlies the democratic-distributive justifications of 
media regulation as “giving the public what it needs.”89 
This shift in the legal understating of the right to free speech is 
manifested in progressive legal theories and doctrines that focus on 
the unique nature of the right to free speech as a public rather than 
individual right.90 Thus, the democratic theory of free speech 
suggested that the purpose of free speech (and of media regulation) 
is not only individual self-actualization of the speaker (or negative 
liberty, which shields speakers from state interference), but also 
the preservation of a functioning democracy by ensuring an 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open public discourse.91 Thus, it 
calls to discard the conservative-liberal skepticism about state 
intervention and acknowledges the “irony of free speech”: under 
conditions of economic inequality, private power is as much of an 
 
87 Id. at 2. 
88 Id. at 2. 
89 See supra Section I.D. 
90 This formulation of the right to free speech as an instrument for ensuring the 
collective needs of a democratic society was suggested by Lee C. Bollinger, as a notable 
founder of the democratic theory of free speech. See Lee C. Bollinger Jr, Freedom of the 
Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976); Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE 
L.J. 438, 451 (1983); LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN (1st ed. 
2010). 
91 See supra note 90. 
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enemy of free speech as is the state; therefore, the state can be a 
friend of freedom and its enemy.92 
Through this lens of political theory, we can now understand 
how current debates over regulating both old and new media are 
divided on an ideological or moral level, between the egalitarian 
and libertarian ends of the liberal spectrum. That is, both the 
practice and theory of media regulation and free speech are divided 
over the relative importance of liberty and equality, as various 
models of liberal democracy (such as “the minimal state” or the 
“welfare state”). 
The lens of political theory reveals that the liberal divide over 
what justice demands with regard to the old media is still the 
primary challenge for contemporary policy-making and judicial 
review regarding media regulation. That is because the traditional 
rationales for media regulation seem to fit much of today’s 
commercial mass-communicative technologies. Moreover, the 
same rationales for either regulation or diminishing the 
constitutional status of broadcast television seem to apply to any 
powerful, commercial, profit-driven medium.93 The focus of 
regulation may have shifted from CBS to Facebook or YouTube 
(as today’s dominant commercial media), but the ideological 
divide between utilitarian and distributive perceptions of justice 
remains the most significant challenge to media regulation 
specifically. Moreover, the libertarian-egalitarian divide is the 
 
92 OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1998). For similar contemporary arguments 
which identifies the private power of dominant speech intermediaries (such as Facebook 
or Google) as the gravest threat of free speech in our current digital age, see, e.g., Balkin, 
supra note 5; Wu, supra note 72. 
93 For the democratic reason for media regulation as based on the commercial nature of 
the dominant mass-media (rather than on their delivery methods), see FEINTUCK & 
VARNEY, supra note 15, at 246 (“[i]t will be necessary to regulate the new media just as 
much as the old if the potential benefits are to be reaped and the blight of domination by 
commercial interests avoided”). See also Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, 
Information Libertarianism, 105 CAL. L. REV. 335, 340 (2017) (describing the 
democratic/progressive theory of free speech as soft-Marxist, since it justifies media 
regulation and lesser constitutional protection based on their commercial, profit-driven 
nature). Thus, the democratic reason should apply to any dominant profit-driven media 
outlet—be it Time Warner, Netflix, or Facebook. 
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most significant challenge of free speech theory and doctrine.94 
Thus, the question about the necessity or permissibility of today’s 
dominant commercial media depends on one’s ideological position 
about the relative importance of liberty and equality as the two 
competing values of liberal democracy.95 
B. The Practical Challenge of Judicial Review: Reaching 
Consensus on Affirmative/Distributive Regulation 
Communication policy consists of regulatory interventions 
specifically designed to promote communicative opportunities by 
allocating speech opportunities from communications proprieties.96 
The legal arena in which the discussion about the legitimacy of 
both “old” and “new” media regulation takes place is the realm of 
public law; and, specifically, the right to free speech as a political 
principle and as a constitutional right. In this constitutional arena, 
the main function of public law and judicial review should be 
understood as instruments for ensuring the legal permissibility of 
the many uses of state power. From this instrumental perspective, 
public law and judicial review supply our political society with 
ideas and doctrines to evaluate whether a specific use of the state’s 
 
94 For contemporary positions that support the libertarian or counter-majoritarian 
reasoning for the right to free speech, see Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without 
Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 555 (1991); 
Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 93, at 340. For contemporary positions that criticize 
the libertarian use of the First Amendment as the right of powerful corporates to evade 
public-interest regulation and calls for a participatory-distributive understanding of free 
speech as a public right, see Sunstein, supra note 34; Tim Wu, The Right to Evade 
Regulation, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 6, 2003); Julie Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119 (2015). For the positive argument by which the Supreme 
Court in the last decades continually adopted the libertarian understating for the First 
Amendment see Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the 
Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition,” 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (2017). 
95 For a discussion of the contemporary divide between the values of liberty and 
equality in First Amendment jurisprudence see Jeremy K. Kessler & David Pozen, The 
Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV 1953, 1953–60 (arguing 
that there exists an inegalitarian tendency within First Amendment jurisprudence, which 
has become more pronounced during the Roberts Court era). 
96 Goodman, supra note 58, at 1211. 
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coercive power is justified, and hence constitutionally 
permissible.97 
In the constitutional sphere, the tension between classic and 
progressive conceptions of liberalism is manifested by the question 
of whether the use of state power over the media should be viewed 
as violating the constitutional right to free speech, or as advancing 
it. Specifically, this tension raises a fundamental question about the 
social function of the right to free speech: is it an individual right 
(that shields speakers against governmental interference) or a 
public right (that justifies or necessitates active governmental 
actions to ensure)? 
At present, after the egalitarian shift of political liberalism, the 
right to free speech is “at war with itself.”98 It seems consensual 
that using state coercive powers to pursue allocative ends should 
not be regarded categorically as unconstitutional (or unjust). With 
that, the movement from suppressive/negative state actions to an 
affirmative use of state power created new challenges for both 
political theory and free speech jurisprudence. Namely, we agree 
that the affirmative use of state power may be permissible under 
some conditions, but we are having great difficulty in specifying 
those particular conditions. Put simply: when the state acts 
affirmatively, there is no consensual standard for judicial review to 
evaluate the legitimacy of positive content duties.99 
Hence, the practical problem of the contemporary legal 
reasoning about the constitutional legitimacy of media regulation is 
that the foundations of public law and judicial review are rooted in 
the classical liberal framework of individual/negative rights. As 
such, they were structured to protect the rights and interest of 
individuals from illegitimate use of state power. When the state 
 
97 For a similar instrumental approach to the theory and doctrines of the First 
Amendment supplying the means, vocabulary, and structural basis for evaluating the 
legitimacy of speech regulation, see Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. 
L. Rev. 1, 7 (2016). 
98 Id. 
99 For the theoretical and doctrinal limitation in evaluating the political and 
constitutional legitimacy of an affirmative use of the right to free speech, see FISS, supra 
note 76, at 21. 
834         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:803 
 
acts as a censor or stipulates negative content duties, the political 
and constitutional legitimacy is evaluated by the familiar harm 
principle.100 However, when the state acts affirmatively, no 
consensual standard of review exists, despite the broad agreement 
that such action is not categorically wrong or unconstitutional.101 
This leads to the practical problem of evaluating the legitimacy of 
public-interest media regulation, which is done with the concept of 
“interests” or “values,” instead of individual rights, on which 
constitutional law is traditionally founded. Since First Amendment 
doctrine favors right over values and negative liberties over 
positive ones,102 it is limited in its instrumental capacity to guide 
judicial reasoning over the legitimacy of media regulation. 
C.  State Neutrality as the Unifying Challenge of Political Theory 
and Free Speech Jurisprudence 
At present, the challenges of political theory and free speech 
jurisprudence with regard to communication policy stem from 
reasonable disagreements about the relative importance of free 
speech rights versus values, and positive liberties versus negative 
liberties. In order to deal with these ideological and practical 
challenges, it is crucial to understand how both political theory and 
free speech jurisprudence are divided over the principle of state 
neutrality as a constraint for any law and policy. 
The liberal principle of state neutrality articulates a constraint 
on permissible or legitimate state actions, by which the state 
should not exercise its coercive powers to promote any specific 
version of the “good” unless societal consensus exists in its 
regard.103 Thus, both classical liberalism and Rawlsian political 
 
100 See infra Part II.C. 
101 FISS, supra note 76, at 28–31. 
102 Goodman, supra note 58, at 1218 (“if a communications proprietors is an editor and 
is constrained by a speech regulation, courts will privilege her rights to be free from such 
constraint over the values served by the regulation by reviewing skeptically and 
regulation that limits her rights in more than an incidental way”). See also id., at 1227–
28. 
103 As Wall suggests, there are three common formulations of the state neutrality 
constraint on the use of state power: “(1) The state should not promote the good, either 
coercively or non-coercively, unless those who are subject to the state’s authority consent 
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liberalism hold that the state should be neutral among rival 
understandings of the good. In contrast, the distributive/democracy
-based justification for free speech and media regulation must 
reject the principle of state neutrality, as it stipulates tangible 
values that the state should actively promote by application of its 
coercive powers. 
This question of state neutrality as a constraint on media law 
and policy arises with the establishment of the democratic rationale 
for media regulation and free speech jurisprudence. Unlike the 
market-based utilitarian rationale, the democratic justification for 
media regulation offers a value theory about different types of 
media content.104 As the socio-historical analysis of the previous 
Part reveals, this democratic reason suggests an ideal perception of 
the social relations between the media, individuals, and society. As 
noted above, this unitary approach to the public interest in the 
context of media regulation is defined by a normative theory or 
broad ideology about what the public needs, absent any sensitivity 
to popular wants.105 
 
 
to its doing so; (2) The state should not aim to promote the good unless there is a societal 
consensus in support of its doing so; (3) The state should not justify what it does by 
appealing to conceptions of the good that are subject to reasonable disagreement.” See 
Steven Wall, Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 8 (E. Zalta ed., 2017). 
104 Of course, Preference Maximization is a value theory. It considers the maximization 
of preferences as the ultimate and sole value to be pursued (for critical discussion, see: 
THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 118–23 (1998)). With that, the 
democratic rational for media regulation offers a more comprehensive value-theory. 
According to the democratic rationale for media regulation, the broad impact of a specific 
media on society and the fact that some elements of media content might be viewed as 
‘merit’ goods (those goods that society, operating through the government, deems to be 
especially important or that those in power feel individuals should be encouraged to 
consume) often served as primary justifications for positive content duties. (FEINTUCK & 
VARNEY, supra note 15, at 117). 
105 With regard to media law and policy, the literature identifies the rationale for media 
regulation in the 20th century as guided by the unitary theory, and thus described as 
“frequently authoritarian, paternalistic or ideoligically contestable character. “ MCQUAIL-
1992, supra note 19, at 23–25. 
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The fundamental aim of the democracy-based justification for 
media regulation and free speech—ensuring that a diverse, high-
quality range of media be made available to all citizens—
incorporates both Rawlsian political liberalism and liberal 
perfectionism. The ideal by which citizens should enjoy some 
degree of equality of access to critical social goods stands at the 
core of Rawlsian political liberalism.106 However, the democracy-
based justification the right to free speech and of media regulation 
takes it one step further: since not all media products (or human 
expression) constitute materials that can be identified as a 
prerequisite of citizenship, the state must adopt content-based 
policies.107 
In political theory, the views that a liberal-democratic state 
may promote an objective account of the good, thus rejecting state 
neutrality as a constraint, are known as perfectionist liberalism.108 
Thus, it is possible to identify the difficulty of this dominant 
approach, as it stems not only from its paternalism (about an 
individual’s wellbeing) but rather from its nature as perfectionist 
 
106 See FISS, supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
107 For this perfectionist-elitist notion of the democracy-based theory of free speech and 
media regulation, see, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 138–41 (1991) 
(prioritizing the value of education for citizenship over the pleasure of entertainment); 
Sunstein, supra note 34, at 528 (describing broadcast television—or ‘the media’—as 
supplying low-quality content aimed at the popular tastes of the uneducated); FEINTUCK 
& VARNEY, supra note 15, at 17–18 (from the democratic perspective on free speech and 
media regulation, entertaining media content is less valuable, and thus, less worthy of 
constitutional protection—than informational or educating media content). See also, Jack 
M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and The First Amendment, 10 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1055, 
1088 (2016) (describing the democratic-progressive theory of free speech as granting 
diminished constitutional protection to artistic or entertaining contents, since those are 
perceived as lacking social value or real contribution to the democratic process of self-
governance). 
108 “Speaking generally, perfectionist writers advance an objective account of the good 
and then develop an account of ethics and/or politics that is informed by this account of 
the good. Different perfectionist writers propose different accounts of the good and arrive 
at different ethical and political conclusions. But all perfectionists defend an account of 
the good that is objective in the sense that it identifies states of affairs, activities, and/or 
relationships as good in themselves and not good in virtue of the fact that they are desired 
or enjoyed by human beings.” Wall, supra note 103. For the meaning of perfectionism 
regarding media law and policy, see Section II.1. 
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liberalism (about society’s well-being), which rejects the principle 
of state neutrality as a constraint on the use of state power.109 
Thus, since political perfectionism denies the principle of state 
neutrality as a constraint on permissible or legitimate state 
action,110 it raises a moral and practical problem for free speech 
jurisprudence and judicial review doctrines that are based on the 
liberal principle of state neutrality.111 The inherent concern is that 
liberal perfectionism is insufficiently sensitive to the harm of 
coercion and the values of liberty and individual autonomy.112 In 
the context of communication policy and speech regulation in 
general, it causes doctrinal problems since the perfectionist aspect 
of the distributive/democracy-based justification rejects the use of 
free speech rights in favor of free speech values and interest. 
Through this lens, we can now see that the unifying problem of 
free speech jurisprudence and political theory is that the idea of 
state neutrality does not correspond with an affirmative or 
allocative use of state power. This concluding argument of the 
 
109 For the contemporary theoretical debate about the similarities and differences 
between liberal perfectionism and paternalism, compare Wall, supra note 103 (arguing 
that not every kind of state perfectionism are paternalistic, due to the noncoercive 
constrain of perfectionist liberalism), with JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT 
PERFECTION (2011) (arguing that liberal perfectionism is almost entirely unable to escape 
the charge of paternalism). 
110 The perfectionist nature of the democracy-based theory of free speech is mostly 
associated with its founding father’s famous assertion that “what is essential is not that 
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.” See ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (2000). 
111 For a moral-legal proposition that rejects perfectionism, claiming the state should be 
neutral to rival understanding of the good, see Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE MORALITY 43 (S. Hampshire ed., 1978); CHARLES LARMORE, PATTERNS OF 
MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
112 Of course, even when acknowledging the harms of coercion and the value of liberty 
regulation can be legitimate. For example, liberal perfectionism which recognizes 
political autonomy as the foundation of any further liberty and lack of coercion, might 
argue that advancing liberty must be done through a guarantee that all can effectively 
participate in politics. With that, in the context of media law and policy both policy 
makers and judicial review fail to acknowledge the harms of regulation to the public 
interest, rather than its harms to the regulated individual. For a discussion of the hidden 
tradeoffs of liberty, equality and diversity in the context of media regulation, see infra 
Section III.C.  
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current Section is mostly descriptive, as it does not “take sides” in 
the clash between political liberalism and liberal perfectionism, 
which are both reasonably acceptable. Instead, the analysis that 
this Section posits suggest that we should understand the familiar 
tensions of liberty/equality, consumer/citizen, and 
individualism/collectivism, vis-à-vis media law and policy, as 
different framings of the same divide. 
When regulation rejects the state neutrality principle by 
defining preferred content that should be protected in the name of 
the public interest, it must adopt some degree of liberal 
perfectionism in prescribing the “good life” that the regulation 
seeks to bring into existence. The unifying problem then comprises 
the concern that the democratic-distributive justifications for free 
speech and media regulation may be insufficiently sensitive to the 
potential social harm of governmental control over the media, and 
to the counter-majoritarian reasoning of the right to free speech. 
In response to those theoretical and practical challenges, the 
next Part suggests a consensual framework for evaluating the 
political and constitutional legitimacy of media law and policy 
while bridging the ideological-moral gap between the libertarian 
and distributive poles of the liberal-democratic spectrum. 
III. CONSENSUAL CONDITIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ANY 
MEDIA REGULATION 
In recent literature, scholars are united in observing that 
reasoning about speech regulation in our age of information must 
develop finer methods of First Amendment review.113 As the 
previous Part illustrated, this is especially true in the context of 
“old” and “new” media regulation. Both the market-based and 
 
113 See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 58, at 1250–61 (“[A] more flexible and context-
sensitive approach to media policy review promises to be more hospitable to the full 
ranges of speech interest implicated by government interventions in media markets”); 
Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 
EMORY L. J. 495, 530 (2015) (arguing that current First Amendment doctrine, which 
adopts a categorical method of evaluation is inadequate for analyzing the complex 
problems involved in constitutional jurisprudence). 
2019] REGULATING SPEECH INTERMEDIARIES 839 
 
democracy-based approaches may accept speech regulation in the 
name of the public interest. They are both united in the 
consequentialist-instrumental perceptions of free speech and media 
policy. However, they are highly divided about the conditions or 
method to evaluate the legitimacy of speech regulation in the name 
of the public interest. 
This Part offers both policymakers and jurists three guiding 
principles for reasoning about the constitutional permissibility of 
regulating “old” and “new” media alike. Section III.A suggests 
how judicial review can avoid the ideological choice between the 
competing theories of justice by adopting the concept of political 
legitimacy. The next two Sections further develop the consensual 
conditions for such legitimacy: rationality (in Section III.B) and 
proportionality (in Section III.C). 
A. Bridging the Ideological Divide: From Justice to Political 
Legitimacy 
Alongside the foundational differences between the competing 
rationales of media regulation, it is essential to bear in mind that 
utilitarianism and Rawlsian liberalism are not necessarily rivals.114 
In fact, both utilitarianism and Rawlsian political liberalism 
emphasize the importance of freedom of expression as a political 
principle and as a constitutional right.115 
 
114 For example, the regulation of primary goods such as water or electricity can be 
justified both by utilitarianism and political liberalism. The former approach would 
justify the use of regulatory power by a cost/benefit analysis of the alternatives and 
suggest that it would be much more efficient that the state manage these natural 
monopolies. This approach would stress the moral duty of the state to equally supply its 
citizens equally with primary goods, which they have a right to that is not (entirely) 
dependent on the ability to pay. See David Brink, Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, 
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (E. Zalta ed., 2018). 
115 For the importance of ensuring fundamental rights, and especially the right to free 
speech within utilitarian philosophy, see Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 143 
(explaining that the root of the “marketplace of ideas” concept traces back to Mill’s 
utilitarian philosophy, as does the concept of social responsibility of the press). For the 
Rawlsian support of the right to free speech as a ‘primary good’, see RAWLS, supra note 
111, at 358. 
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With that, the potential solutions to contemporary dilemmas, 
such as the legitimacy of net-neutrality rules, of content regulation 
on digital platforms, and of the protected status of media 
corporations, are still highly contested on the political-ideological 
sphere.116 As the previous Part showed, these conflicts and 
tensions between the utility-based and rights-based approaches to 
the legitimacy of speech regulation might not be neatly resolved, 
since they offer competing and reasonable stands (or ideologies) 
about the relative importance of individual liberty and collective 
needs of society.117 
To help resolve the ideological divide between the competing 
theories of justice with regard to media law and policy, this Part 
suggests that judicial review over speech-related regulation should 
evaluate the political legitimacy of the regulatory act (is the state 
act constitutionally permissible?), rather than choose between 
competing notions of justice (what is the right thing for the state to 
do?). 
In political theory, the common definition of “political 
legitimacy” is a virtue of political institutions and of laws and 
policies, which refers to some benchmark of acceptability or 
justification of coercive political power.118 This normative concept 
of political legitimacy is often equated with justice, since justice 
and legitimacy commonly draw on the same set of political 
values.119 Thus, the main problem that a conception of legitimacy 
 
116 See Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 141–46 (addressing the legitimacy of net-
neutrality rules as contested between utilitarian and distributive theories of justice); see 
also Kessler & Pozen, supra note 95, at 1987 (addressing the legitimacy of regulating 
social media platforms as contested between libertarian and egalitarian ideologies). 
117 See supra Part II. 
118 Peter Fabienne, Political Legitimacy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2017 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/ (last visited Nov. 
29, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5YP3-US9H]; Arthur Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32 
PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 2 (2004). 
119 Rawls considers political legitimacy and justice to be related—but not identical—as 
they occupy different moral domains; thus, legitimacy makes weaker demands than 
justice. RAWLS-1993, supra note 111, at 225. This interpretation of Rawls is based on 
Wall. See generally Wall, supra note 103. 
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aims to solve is how to distinguish the rightful use of political 
power from unjust coercion. 
The problem of distinguishing the rightful use of political 
power from mere coercion is precisely the instrumental function of 
public law and of judicial review. Hence, whether we equate 
political legitimacy with justice or see it as a different form of 
morality, we can use the concept of political legitimacy as a 
justification of political authority.120 Through this framework, we 
can think of public law and judicial review as instruments for 
securing the political legitimacy of various state actions. When we 
ask if a specific rule or regulation is constitutionally permissible, 
we actually inquire into its political legitimacy. In this respect, 
judicial review over state actions utilizes doctrinal tests for 
evaluating the political legitimacy (i.e., the constitutionality) of the 
state’s use of its coercive powers and supplies different remedies in 
case use of state power is found to be illegitimate. 
Adopting this instrumental concept of political legitimacy 
enables us to bridge political morality and public law—where the 
latter is our legal instrument for evaluating and enforcing the 
political legitimacy of governmental actions. In both political 
theory and public law, this criterion of legitimacy is negative: it 
offers an account of when effective authority ceases to be 
legitimate.121 
Therefore, both policymakers and judicial review should use 
the normative concept of political legitimacy as a consensual 
framework for evaluating the coercive political authority that is 
exercised on the various forms of media in the twenty-first century, 
such as regulatory institutions and regulatory rules (set by either 
 
120 Joseph Raz links legitimacy to the justification of political authority by arguing that 
political authority is just a special case of the more general concept of authority. For this 
interpretation of Raz, see Fabienne, supra note 118. Alternately, the relations between 
legitimacy and the creation of authority may be understood as follows: the attempt to rule 
without legitimacy is an attempt to exercise coercive power, not authority. Such a view is 
associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who defines legitimacy as justification for the 
state’s exercise of coercive power and as creating an obligation to obey. See JEAN 
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1988) (1762). 
121 Fabienne, supra note 118.  
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legislation or administrative actions). Hence, an understanding of 
the consensual liberal-democratic conditions for political 
legitimacy is necessary for evaluating the existing regulatory 
practices affecting various media (including broadcast, cable, and 
satellite television) and structuring public policy about yet-
unregulated media (such as Netflix, Google, and Facebook). 
In addressing the contemporary problems of free speech 
jurisprudence discussed in Part II, the next Sections of this Part 
identify and develop the two consensual conditions for legitimacy, 
be they justified on the basis of securing individual liberty and 
autonomy, or on the basis of pursuing collective-social interests 
and needs: (a) rationality (the demand for social facts) and (b) 
proportionality (between the core values of both media regulation 
and free speech jurisprudence: individual liberty, equality, and 
diversity).122 
B. Rationality: Reviewing the Factual Arguments of Both 
Utilitarian and Democracy-Based Justifications of Media 
Regulation 
1. Different Regulatory Rules Require Different Justifications 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the conflict 
between the state and free speech was manifested in suppression 
and prohibitions of the mass-media; throughout the twentieth 
century, it was reshaped into permission and then a prescription.123 
Due to the many possible uses of state powers with regard to mass 
communicative technologies, this Section argues that suppressions 
of and prohibitions on the media and their content rely on a 
different rationale than regulatory duties of prescription. Hence, 
the principle of rationality demands that each regulatory duty must 
be evaluated by its own reasoning. 
 
122 See generally Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9. 
123 See MCQUAIL-1992, supra note 19, at 9 (tracing the conflict between state authority 
and media freedom through the early stages of suppression and prohibition (regarding the 
press), to permission, and then prescription (regarding regulation of audio-visual 
services)). 
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To understand the different justifications that different media 
regulation rationales require, it is helpful to sketch a general 
taxonomy of the typical practices of state coercive power in the 
context of media regulation, alongside the distinct reasons that 
legitimize those typical regulatory duties: 
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outputs.124 
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124 For the importance of diversity as a post-liberal addition to the values of 
liberty and equality, see infra Part III.C.1. 
125 As elaborated in the previous Part, the term of ‘perfectionism’ in moral and 
legal philosophy is usually contrasted with utilitarianism or political liberalism, 
since perfectionist liberalism rejects the principle of state neutrality as the basic 
constraint over the use of state power. See supra Part II.  
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This table does not offer a full description of the many uses of 
state power in relation to the media or speech regulation in general. 
Nevertheless, it allows us to identify the specific rationale(s) for 
justifying typical uses of state power with regard to the media. 
When the state uses its powers for prohibition or suppression of 
speech or speakers (negative content duties), a consensual standard 
exists for evaluating its political or constitutional legitimacy: the 
harm principle from classical liberalism.126 Such duties (as a 
violation of free speech rights) are usually founded on the state’s 
responsibility to protect the well-being of individuals or society 
from potential harms.127 In the realm of media law and policy, this 
kind of content regulation is highly prone to legitimacy problems 
by rationality. As a matter of principle, no significant dispute exists 
over the moral legitimacy of such rules, since avoiding harms is 
undoubtedly a legitimate goal of regulation (as something that the 
public wants and needs).128 Thus, the political and constitutional 
legitimacy of negative content duties is mostly a factual question, 
rather than a normative one: what are the probability and the scale 
of harm expected absent any regulation? 
However, when the state uses its coercive powers in an 
affirmative or prescriptive matter (for example, adopting positive 
content duties or subsidizing preferred content), the matter 
becomes more complicated and less consensual. Application of 
positive content duties (which coerce the media to produce and 
deliver “preferred content”) should be assessed as an affirmative or 
perfectionist act, which usually rejects the liberal principle of state 
neutrality. Although that kind of regulatory duties is not 
categorically wrong, both policymakers and judicial review must 
acknowledge the internal reservation of this political perspective: 
perfectionist liberalism considers the use of the state’s coercive 
power to be illegitimate (compared to non-coercive measures, such 
 
126 This standard compares the benefits and risks of the ‘harmful’ speech with the 
benefits and harms of the governmental suppression. 
127 See infra Part II.C. 
128 See Gregory C. Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91. SO. 
CAL. L. REV. 195, 197 (2018). 
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as subsidies or public broadcast).129 Moreover, positive content 
duties are often motivated not only by the desire to expand any 
valuable way of life but also by the assumption that particular 
media content is better or more desirable to society than others 
are.130 
Based on this argument, it is possible to draw some guiding 
principles for evaluating the political legitimacy of state power that 
is used for distributive or perfectionist components of the public 
interest in the media: 
(a) Within the framework of liberal perfectionism, coercion is 
considered the inferior option for pursing perfectionist ends.131 
Thus, the use of direct content regulation needs to be justified over 
other means for allocative regulation, such as subsidies or public 
service media. (b) Since perfectionist liberalism departs from the 
constitutional framework of individual rights and their possible 
violation, we cannot judge the legitimacy of perfectionist use of 
state power (such as positive content duties) without developing 
new analytical tools. When it comes to evaluating the legitimacy of 
the suppressive or restrictive regulatory duties over media and 
content, the good old harm principle serves as a consensual 
standard. However, in evaluating the permissive or prescriptive use 
of state power to regulate media and content, we need to define its 
own intrinsic reason and conditions for legitimacy, without 
resorting to ideological dispositions about the relative importance 
of liberty and equality. That is the power of the rationality 
condition, which can be applied contextually to the rationales of 
 
129 See supra note 131. For the distinction between coercive and non-coercive means of 
media regulation, see Sunstein, supra note 34, at 505. 
130 A prime example in theory and practice of media regulation and free speech 
jurisprudence, is that political speech (such as the printed and electronic press) is 
considered of higher social value (hence, more protected against regulation), compared to 
fictional or irrational entertainment of popular culture. For the reluctance of the 
democratic theory to grant popular culture and mass media with the same constitutional 
protection of the press, see supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
131 See THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 157 (1993); see also Wall, supra note 103 
(“Most perfectionist writers accept that sometimes the state can permissibly use coercion 
to promote the good. Still, coercion is in general a clumsy device for pursuing 
perfectionist ends.”). 
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various regulatory duties. Only after identifying the specific 
rationale that justifies given regulatory duties, the review process 
can proceed to examine the substantial part of the rationality 
condition—facts and evidence—since different justification 
requires different facts to assert legitimacy. 
2. Every Regulation Requires Facts 
In any version of liberalism, a foundational condition for the 
political legitimacy of using the state’s coercive power is the 
rationality requirement: the use (or absence) of regulatory powers 
must be supported by social facts, in contrast to pure-moral 
arguments (and as opposed to sovereign arbitrariness).132 The 
importance of social facts for evaluating the legitimacy of state 
power is also a fundamental notion of legal realism.133 Thus, both 
rights-based and welfare approaches to constitutional rights agree 
that public policy and legal rules must rely on facts and data (that 
social sciences supply), since regulating speech on the basis of 
mere ideology is suspected as politically immoral or instrumentally 
flawed. 
The kind of social facts that are essential for evaluating the 
political or constitutional legitimacy of specific media law and 
policy depends on the factual premises of the particular reason that 
underlies the reviewed regulatory duty. The most relevant sources 
of data and facts in the context of media regulation are the social 
sciences and media studies. Over the last decades, scientific 
research produced over 10,000 theoretical and empirical studies 
about the various effects, of various media, on various 
audiences.134 By utilizing research methods of the social sciences 
 
132 Both classical liberalism and perfectionist versions of liberalism support this 
position. See Joseph Raz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF 
LAW AND POLITICS 210 (1995) (“All law is source-based . . . . A law is source-based if its 
existence and content can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort 
to any evaluative argument.”). 
133 See Rosco Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. 
L. REV. 489, 510–13 (1911) (jurists must take account of the “social facts” to which 
various legal institutions apply and evaluate “the actual social effects of legal institutions 
and doctrines”). 
134 See Potter, supra note 54, at 12. 
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(experiments, observations, surveys, statistical analysis, and 
content analysis), the discipline of media studies supplies essential 
data and facts about the power and influence of the media. 
The importance of facts in policy making or in the process of 
judicial review may seem trivial; and indeed, it should. However, 
the century-long experience in media regulation and its judicial 
review demonstrates an ongoing tendency to base the regulatory 
reasoning on unfounded beliefs or assumptions about the media 
and their audiences.135 
In the case of prohibiting or suppressing regulation, the factual 
insights that contemporary social sciences (and media studies in 
particular) supply undermines many common assumptions about 
the media’s unique power to harm individuals and society. For 
example, studies showing that the media have a limited effect on 
the attitudes or behavior of their audience136 might rule out the 
political and constitutional legitimacy of media law and policy 
based on the harm principle, by suggesting that no compelling 
interest exists to regulate to so-called “harmful” content or 
medium.137 
It is not possible to describe the full scope of facts revealed by 
the contemporary research on media effect. That said, a focus on 
most recent literature uncovers that traditional assumptions about 
the media’s omnipotent power to influence their audiences are 
 
135 See MCQUAIL-2010, supra note 17, at 564; see also POTTER, supra note 54, at xv 
(describing the public discussion about harmful media effects as based on “unfounded 
beliefs rather than on sold knowledge”). 
136 For examples, see infra Table 2. 
137 The special importance of social facts as a condition for political and constitutional 
legitimacy is exemplified by the ‘substantial evidence requirement’ of free speech 
jurisprudence. If the government interest is sufficiently important in the abstract, the 
government still “must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely 
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and 
material way.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994). For the importance 
and flaws of the substantial evidence requirement regarding new forms of mass media 
(since the core claims of proponents and opponents are difficult to test systematically 
against historical empirical evidences), see Schejter & Yemini, supra note 9, at 168. 
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highly contested.138 In fact, recent literature that adopts meta-
analysis of the aggregated empirical data about the effects of 
various types of media use supplies important social facts about the 
media’s relatively weak “harmful” effects.139 Most of the common 
assumptions about the harmful power of the media lack a sufficient 
rational basis, as the causality between media consumption and 
harmful effects is relatively weak.140 These findings, along with 
other contemporary meta-analysis research, demonstrate that, 
although the media’s impact may be significant, it is not very 
substantial, since the variance accounted for by media exposure is 
quite small.141 Moreover, these recent findings show that the 
media’s pro-social effects are significantly higher than their 
harmful effects.142 
These examples of relevant empirical social facts, which 
should guide the rationality condition for political legitimacy, add 
to the broader insights of contemporary media studies, by which 
the public and governmental perception of risk with regard to the 
media is mostly a “moral panic” based on little evidence of the 
media’s actual harmful effects.143 As contemporary literature 
suggests: 
Despite hopeful as well as fearful scenarios, the 
passing of decades does not seem to have changed 
the tendency of public opinion both the blame the 
media and to demand that they do more to solve 
 
138 NORMAN L. MEDOFF & BARBARA K. KAYE, ELECTRONIC MEDIA: THEN, NOW, AND 
LATER 1404 (3d ed. 2016); ELIZABETH PERSE & JENNIFER LABME, MEDIA EFFECTS AND 
SOCIETY (2017). 
139 Patti Valkenburg et al., Media Effects: Theory and Research, 67 ANN. REV. OF 
PSYCHOL. 315, 318 (2016). 
140 Id. Of thirty-four behaviors studied in nineteen analyses, just three showed moderate 
or greater correlations between media exposure and negative outcomes. Id.  
141 See PERSE & LAMBE, supra note 138, at 8. 
142 See Valkenburg, supra note 139, at 318; PERSE & LAMBE, supra note 138, at 8. 
143 The term ‘moral panic’ was originally applied to a sudden expression of irrational 
mass anxiety and social concern about crime, disorder, or social breakdown. As McQuail 
explains, both the televised medium of the 20th century and new form of media (such as 
the internet or computer games) generates moral panic at alleged harm to their users. See 
MCQUAIL-2010, supra note 17, at 564. 
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society’s ill. There are successive instances of alarm 
relating to the media, whenever an insoluble or 
inexplicable social problem arises. The most 
constant element has been a negative perception of 
the media—especially the inclination to link media 
portrayals of crime, sex and violence with the 
seeming increase in social and moral disorder. 
These waves of alarm have been called ‘moral 
panics’, partly because they are based on little 
evidence either of media cause or actual effect.144 
This brief review of the empirical and sociological sources of 
data and social facts does not lead to the conclusion that all harm-
based justifications for media regulation are irrational or flawed. 
Rather, the argument of this Section about the critical contribution 
of social facts to the condition of rationality is that the century-
long experience with media regulation teaches us a valuable lesson 
about the public and governmental evaluation biases regarding the 
risks and benefits of emerging communicative technologies. The 
sociological insights about the media and its regulation show that 
both government and public opinion tend to view the media as a 
problem or scapegoat for deep social ills,145 thereby creating fertile 
grounds for unique suppressive regulation over the media. 
Hence, the condition of rationality (as the demand to base 
policies and regulations on social facts) has a critical function in 
media regulation due to the century-long experience with 
regulating, which demonstrates a consistent tendency to overvalue 
the risks from new communicative technologies—as a primary 
 
144 See MCQUAIL 2010, supra note 17, at 55. See also POTTER, supra note 54, at xv 
(describing the public discussion about harmful media effects as based on “unfounded 
beliefs rather than on sold knowledge”). 
145 For the most recent literature in this context, see PERSE & LAMBE, supra note 138, at 
7 (“Although some politicians are motivated to promote public interest and media 
responsibility, others see media as convenient and easily understood scapegoats for social 
problems. Although there certainly are reasons to be concerned about the level of 
violence in our society, it is clearly simplistic and misleading to hold that violent themes 
in popular music, movies, comics book or television might be the major cause for 
delinquency and the violent crime rate.”). 
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justification for governmental regulation of it, in the name of the 
public interest.146 Present regulations of mass-communicative 
technologies (such as IPTV, Netflix, YouTube, and Facebook) can 
avoid past mistakes, namely the tendency to base public policy or 
legal reasoning on unfounded beliefs about the unique harmful 
power of the media. Moreover, even if the shared beliefs about 
television’s power to influence viewers against their will had 
sufficient rational basis, this does not seem to be the case with 
regard to the new media of the twenty-first century.147 
In conclusion, the argument of this Section is not about the 
factual question about the scope and extent of the risk that the 
media pose to individuals or society. The argument here concerns 
the methods to evaluate the legitimacy of specific regulatory duties 
by demanding substantive evidence for the necessity of using the 
state’s coercive powers in the name of the public interest. In this 
context, rationality—as a consensual condition of political and 
constitutional legitimacy—of state power requires a two-step 
analysis: (1) identifying the specific justification which supports 
the reviewed regulatory duty and (2) confronting the underlying 
factual assumptions of the relevant justification with relevant 
social facts about the subjects of regulation: the media and their 
audiences. 
 
146 For literature identifying the governmental tendency to frame new communication 
technologies as dangerous to society, since those new ways of communication have 
unique potential to disrupt the established power relations in society, see HAROLD INNIS, 
EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATION (1950); BRIAN WINSTON, MISUNDERSTANDING MEDIA 
(1986). For the general argument about the human biases in assessing the expected harm 
of speech or information, see Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 93, at 366–78. 
147 New media are considered weaker in their ability to persuade or inform the public, 
due to the selectivity of the view as a user. See, e.g., MCQUAIL-2010, supra note 17, at 
545 (in the age of new media, “[t]here is no longer any unitary ‘message system’ to 
which people are routinely and consistently exposed, leading to stereotypes or consensual 
values. Individuals are no longer restricted by their immediate social group and the 
physical availability of a few media channels, controlled by authorities and other 
agencies”). See Peter Bajomi-Lazar, Audience Resistance: Reasons to Relax Content 
Regulation, in MEDIA FREEDOM AND PLURALISM 175 (Beata Klimkeiwicz ed., 2010) (in 
the political economy of online content, the media no longer dictate public taste and 
opinions, but rather are affected by it—due to the selectivity powers of their audiences). 
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Indeed, consensus exists that social facts must inform policy-
making. However, the century-long experience with media 
regulation teaches us that judicial review of emerging 
communicative technologies’ regulation should adopt a healthy 
sense of skepticism about the necessity of such regulation. In 
contrast to the existing legal discussion, this call for suspicion does 
not stem from a conservative or libertarian position, favoring 
individual liberty over equality and distributive considerations, but 
from ideology-neutral instrumental considerations: first, it is 
impossible to ignore the natural tendency of both governmental 
and private power-brokers to resist social changes that inherently 
threaten their status. Thus, since speech (and especially mass-
speech platforms) comprises an engine of change, skepticism is 
needed with regard to both the suppressive and prescriptive 
regulation of media or their content in the name of the liberal harm 
principle. Second, the demand for skepticism and social facts about 
the necessity of media regulation stems from the non-legal 
findings, which indicate the government’s consistent bias to 
overestimate the risks and underestimate the social value of the 
media and their outputs. 
Based on those instrumental considerations, the general 
argument of this Section about the condition of rationality is that 
legal reasoning about the legitimacy of media regulation must be 
undertaken contextually, by identifying the various factual 
assumptions of the various justifications. This contextual 
examination must be conducted in light of the social facts 
emerging from the relevant non-legal fields of knowledge, which 
provide a necessary tool for assessing the rationality of state 
intervention. Simply put, even if regulation might be a necessary 
friend of free speech, judicial review must examine the necessity of 
regulation as a factual matter, by relying on facts and data that 
contemporary social sciences supply. 
C. Proportionality: The Hidden Trade-offs Between Liberty, 
Equality, and Diversity in Media Regulation 
In political and legal discourse, the principle of proportionality 
is used as a criterion of fairness and justice, or as a logical method 
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intended to assist in discerning the correct balance between 
individual rights and collective needs.148 In the constitutional 
domain, the principle of proportionality stems from the notion that 
constitutional rights are not absolutes, since they can be violated if 
there is a good enough reason for doing so, namely for the 
protection of other individual rights or to achieve collective social 
needs (or the wellbeing of society).149 
This Section frames the concept of proportionality as a 
consensual condition for political legitimacy in the context of 
media regulation and its judicial review. In this context, 
proportionality can be framed as the demand for accommodation 
of competing rights, interests, or values that are associated with the 
media and its regulation.150 Unlike common free speech 
jurisprudence, which focuses on proportionality between 
individual rights and public interest, I suggest here that the 
proportionality of specific regulatory duties should be evaluated 
with sensitivity to the conflicts and tensions between the core 
values of media law and policy: liberty, equality, and diversity. 
Within this framework, the ties and frictions between the values of 
liberty and equality are well-known as the liberal divide between 
utilitarian and distributive theories of justice. Alongside the 
familiar ties and frictions between liberty and equality, both 
positive and normative theories of the mass media identify 
diversity as a distinct social value or a regulatory end. 
 
148 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE 
L.J. 3094, 3096 (2015). 
149 For the role of the proportionality principle within a non-absolute perception of 
constitutional rights, see AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY (2012). For a discussion of 
the relationship between absolute rights and the principle of proportionality, see Gregoire 
Webber, Proportionality and Absolute rights, in PROPORTIONALITY: NEW FRONTIERS, 
NEW CHALLENGES (Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet eds., 2016). 
150 The American Supreme Court consistently rejects the concept of “balancing” in the 
context of judicial review. See Tsesis, supra note 113. With that, the categorical approach 
which the Court adopts for resolving First Amendment cases does adhere to the principle 
of proportionality (as considering the social benefits and costs of regulation), which is 
embedded in the doctrines of overbreadth and the least restrictive mean requirement. For 
identifying the various elements of proportionality in American constitutional law, see 
generally Jackson, supra note 148. 
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1. The Consensual Value of Diversity as a Mean and as an 
End 
In the literature from media studies and mass communication 
theory, diversity is considered an independent factor by which the 
performance of the media is evaluated, alongside liberty and 
equality.151 The intrinsic value of diversity in media law and policy 
(or as a third component of the public interest, alongside liberty 
and equality) is not just as a means to achieve what the public 
wants, but also as an essential component of what a democratic 
society needs. Thus, diversity stands very close to freedom and 
equality as a key concept in any discussion of media law and 
policy (and as a key value of free speech as a democratic principle 
and a constitutional right).152 
Alternatively, the value of diversity in media outlets and 
outputs can be described as non-intrinsic, but rather interrelated to 
various aspects of liberty or equality. As McQuail suggests, the 
main public benefits expected from diversity (as a means or as an 
end) are paving the way for a social and cultural change; providing 
a check on the misuse of freedom; enabling minorities to maintain 
their existence in a larger society; limiting social conflicts by 
increasing the chances of understanding between potentially 
opposed groups and interest; and maximizing the benefits of the 
 
151 See, e.g., FEINTUCK & VARNEY, supra note 15, at 59 (“Diversity (both political and 
cultural) is a considered as a separate, free-standing rationale for media regulation”); 
MCQUAIL-2010, supra note 17, at 192–98 (framing diversity as an independent principle 
of media structure and performance, alongside freedom and equality, and describing the 
benefits of diversity to society as paving the way for social and cultural change). 
152 See FEINTUCK & VARNEY, supra note 15, at 82 (“Both ‘paternalists’, who seek a 
‘properly informed’ public, and libertarians who emphasis choice, share an objective of 
diversity in media output. The common ground is that diversity is desirable, the 
difference is in response to the question ‘why?’ [ . . . ] If diversity in media output is 
universally valued, and if it cannot necessarily be guaranteed without regulation, then 
media regulation targeted at diversity appears to be justified”); Id. at 112 (within the 
democratic justification for media regulation, “the plurality of the media is pursued not as 
an end in itself, but as a means of furthering effective choice, as a prerequisite of 
meaningful citizenship”). See also Goodman supra note 58, at 1230 (noting that the 
Supreme Court characterized diverse speech as “a principal instrumental goal, rather than 
merely an underlying value, of the First Amendment”). 
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free marketplace of ideas.153 In any case, both the utilitarian 
market-based approach and the democracy-based approach to 
media regulation share the objective of diversity in the media 
output (in order to satisfy consumer’s diverse preferences or to 
ensure vibrant and robust public discourse). Thus, the value of 
diversity is highly consensual, though at times diversity of outputs 
can be countered by other contradictory objectives.154 
2. The Need to Proportionately Accommodate Liberty, 
Equality, and Diversity 
As the discussion in Part II demonstrated, the foundational 
divide between the competing reasons for media regulation 
revolves around the relative value of individual liberty and 
collective needs. Within this framework, judicial review of 
regulatory duties is usually constructed as a balance between the 
costs of regulation (infringements of the media’s constitutional 
rights) and its gains for the greater good or the public interest.155 
The argument in this Section suggests that this common 
framework of proportionality fails to recognize the hidden social 
costs of media regulation, which might promote one aspect of the 
public interest while simultaneously harming another aspect of the 
public interest (and not just the media’s constitutional rights). By 
adding the independent value of diversity to the binary framework 
of liberty vs. equality, we can expose the hidden constitutional 
costs of typical media regulation. As illustrated in Table 2, those 
hidden costs are the inherent tradeoff between the consensual 
components of the public interest in the media. 
 
 
153 See MCQUAIL -2010, supra note 17, at 197. 
154 For acknowledging diverse speech as a principle instrumental goal of the First 
Amendment in the Supreme Court Decisions regarding broadcast and cable media, see 
Goodman, supra note 58, at 1230. 
155 See Goodman, supra note 58, at 1254 (“when there are competing First Amendment 
interests on both sides of the equation, the key question becomes one of proper fit 
between speech benefits and burdens”). 
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TABLE 2: MUTUAL TRADEOFFS BETWEEN LIBERTY, EQUALITY,  
AND DIVERSITY 
The public-interest value that 
regulation promotes 
The hidden cost of regulation 
vis-à-vis other public-interest 
values 
Liberty 
(The public interest in protecting 
media freedom from 
governmental/majoritarian 
coercion) 
Equality (of access and 
representation) 
or 
Diversity (of sources and content) 
 
 





(The public interest in protecting 




Diversity (of sources and content) 
 
 
Diversity (of sources and content) 
Liberty 
(the public interest to keep the 




Equality (of access and 
representation) 
The inherent tradeoffs between liberty and equality are well 
known to political theory and free speech jurisprudence.156 With 
that, the present discussion exposes the hidden constitutional costs 
of media regulation within the public interest framework. 
 
156 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 143 (2010). 
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a) When the state uses its coercive powers over the media 
to pursue equality and diversity, then liberty must be 
compromised.  
As elaborated in the previous section, both the market-based 
and democracy-based perceptions of the public interest with regard 
to commercial media assume that “full liberty” (i.e., no regulation) 
results in undesirable consequences to the diversity of media 
outlets and outputs. Thus, limiting the liberty of the media—for the 
sake of either correcting market failures or promoting the 
democratic values of equality and diversity—triggers the well-
known conflict with individual negative liberty. 
The hidden constitutional costs of media regulation can be 
described by examining the other combinations: 
b) When the state uses its coercive powers over the media 
to pursue liberty and equality, then diversity must be 
compromised (as is the case with free/broadcast-like 
media) / When the state uses its coercive powers over 
the media to pursue liberty and diversity, then equality 
must be compromised (as is the case with premium 
pay-based media). 
The liberal cost of pursuing both egalitarian values and 
diversity of media outputs is often hidden from both the utilitarian-
economic and rights-based perspectives. It can be exemplified by 
comparing subscription-based media (i.e., cables, Netflix, and 
magazines) and “free” media services (i.e., broadcast television, 
YouTube, and free newspapers). “Free” media services, which do 
not exclude people from their outputs, greatly promote the 
egalitarian component of the public interest. However, “free” 
mass-media services are limited in their ability to supply quality or 
a diversity of media outputs in comparison to pay-based media. 
Respectably, the practical lesson from the century-long regulation 
of commercial media is that regulatory policy seeking to promote 
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free media services diminishes the amount, diversity, or quality of 
media products. 157 
As an answer to this often-hidden tension between the values 
of equality and diversity in the context of media law and policy, 
the proportionality requirement must be further developed in order 
to acknowledge these often-hidden tradeoffs. The argument here is 
instrumental, rather than normative, as it does not weigh in on the 
relative importance or priority of the social values that justice 
demands. Rather, it argues that decision-making about the 
constitutional legitimacy of specific regulation must weigh the 
unavoidable trade-offs between the competing values that guide 
media regulation and free speech jurisprudence. 
The discussion above illustrates that there is a high degree of 
reciprocity between the multiple values that comprise the public 
interest in the media. However, despite the interrelations between 
freedom, equality, and diversity—as the core values of the public 
interest in media law and policy—these values are often mutually 
exclusive: state promotion of any two such values usually comes at 
the expense of the third. This understanding is critical for current 
theory and doctrine, as they focus only on comparing the expected 
benefits of regulation to the public interest with its burden on the 
rights and interests of regulated media. 
This understanding of the hidden trade-offs between the 
various components of the public interest is not just theoretical. 
Within current First Amendment doctrine, judicial review 
evaluates the constitutional legitimacy of speech regulation by the 
 
157 The economic explanation to this tradeoff is based on the nature of ‘free’ media 
services as public goods (characterized by non-rival use and the inability to exclude) and 
as commercial products with near-zero marginal costs (whose first-copy cost is very 
high). See Cristopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1579 (2003). A recent example can be found in the decisions of online 
premium content outlets to adopt a pay-based business model, to insure the diversity or 
quality, which ‘free’ media services are limited in their ability to supply. See Ricardo 
Bilton, Learning from the New Yorker, Wired’s new paywall aims to build a more “stable 
financial future,” NIEMANLAB (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/02
/learning-from-the-new-yorker-wireds-new-paywall-aims-to-build-a-more-stable-
financial-future [https://perma.cc/D7HR-36EA]. 
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“narrowly-tailored” or “the least restrictive means” tests of strict 
scrutiny, which are in fact measures for evaluating proportionality 
of government regulation.158 With that, First Amendment doctrine 
favors rights over values (and negative liberties over positive 
ones).159 Thus, in evaluating the constitutional legitimacy of any 
media law or policy (or in balancing free speech values), judicial 
review and its doctrine should consider the full constitutional costs 
of media regulation: media regulation not only compromises the 
speech rights of the commercial media outlets (as the direct 
subjects of regulation), but might also compromise the various, 
often-competing components of the public interest in the media.160 
Adopting this framework of proportionality for acknowledging 
the full scope of the regulatory burden between various 
components of the public interests would benefit both market-
based and democracy-based sides of the liberal spectrum. Whether 
we seek to better inform our cost/benefit analysis or find the just 
balance between individual rights and the collective interest, we 
must expand our view of the regulatory burden, which is usually 
focused on the regulated media. Considering the plurality of aims 
and social values which compose “the public interest” in regulating 
the various new forms of digital media, decision-making about its 
legitimacy must be well-informed about its consequences on 
various aspects of society’s well-being. Due to the consequentialist 
nature of both market-based and democracy-based methods of 
 
158 See Jackson, supra note 148, at 3096. 
159 See Goodman, supra note 58, at 1218. The notable exception to this judicial 
reasoning is Justice Breyer’s balancing approach, which rejects the categorical treatment 
of public-interest regulation of commercial media as presumptively constitutional or 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 
U.S. 727 (1996); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
160 Evidence of this approach in First Amendment jurisprudence can be seen in Justice 
Breyer’s balancing method of review, as “the beginnings of a more pragmatic and 
contextualized review of laws that implicate speech interests on both sides.” See 
Goodman, supra note 58, at 1252–56 (referring to Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in 
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2010), in which he argued for “proportionality 
review” in contrast to the existing doctrine of categorical reasoning). For other recent 
cases in which the Court engaged in balancing without resorting to categorical analysis, 
see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 
U.S. 443 (2011). 
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reasoning about legitimacy, accurate accounting of the potential 
gains and losses of regulation on both individual liberty and 
collective needs of society must be done. This framework of 
proportionality or balancing is not ad hoc decision-making, but 
rather a value-plural, fact-based method to appropriately balance 
the expected gains and losses of present and future regulations of 
communication and information services. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the last century, market-based and democracy-based 
rationales have fought each other about the sources and constraints 
of government interventions in media markets. At present, as was 
the case in the previous century, the rapid changes in 
communication technologies present new challenges for First 
Amendment jurisprudence and media regulation. This Article 
focuses on the instrumental functions of public law and judicial 
review for securing the political legitimacy of the many possible 
uses of state power in regulating the media. At its core, the 
discussion here focuses on the question of legitimacy, common to 
political theory and constitutional law: how should the rightful use 
of political power be distinguished from illegitimate coercion? 
That question is of much importance now, as it was with regard to 
the old media, as both market-based and distributive/democracy-
based rationales for speech regulation acknowledge that they 
concern not only the rights of speakers, but also the collective 
interest (or values) of a democratic and free society. 
Since the various rationales and objectives for regulatory 
interventions seem contradictory and inconsistent, the most 
important lesson from the century-long experience of media 
regulation is that evaluation of specific policies or regulations 
requires clarity as to the values and principles that should guide 
public policy and its judicial review. The ambiguity (or competing 
perceptions) of “the public interest” as a political or legal concept 
is unacceptable in the context of media regulation and free speech. 
Absent the setting of clear objectives, the existence of a reasonable 
divide about the underlying raison d’etre of media regulation 
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makes its legitimacy challenging to assess. Hence, treating media 
regulation as presumptively constitutional or unconstitutional lacks 
the sufficient sensitivity in contextualizing litigants’ various 
interests and the impacts of regulation on the well-being of 
individuals and society at large. 
Through the lens of political theory, we can understand how 
current debates over (both old and new) media regulation are 
divided on an ideological sphere between the egalitarian and 
libertarian ends of the liberal spectrum (or over the relative 
importance of liberty and equality in a liberal democracy). By 
acknowledging those divides in the theory and the practice of 
media regulation, this Article exposes the problems free speech 
jurisprudence and judicial review in evaluating the legitimacy or 
permissibility of specific regulations. 
In response, this Article proposes a fact-based, context-
sensitive framework for examining the constitutional legitimacy or 
permissibility of media regulation. It aims to enrich the legal 
discourse on freedom of speech by offering sociological and 
empirical perspectives on the media regulation, while also 
contributing to the broader issue of the regulation of public 
discourse and judicial review of such governmental actions. 
Building on the insights of political theory and the social sciences, 
the inter-disciplinary approach exemplified in this paper supplies a 
value-plural, fact-based method to appropriately balance the 
expected gains and losses of present and future regulations of 
communication and information services. 
Altogether, this Article strives to offer a refined understanding 
of media regulation as a social phenomenon and a subject for 
judicial review. The theoretical and practical discussion here 
supplies the judge, the regulator, and the citizen with tools to 
understand and evaluate the legitimacy or desirability of various 
regulatory practices—present and future—through a structured, 
fact-based method. Moreover, it exposes the essence of media 
regulation as a socio-cultural arrangement that carries social costs, 
which are sometimes hidden from political or judicial view. 
